1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE
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4	MONEY MAILER, LLC,) C15-1215-RSL
5) Plaintiff,) SEATTLE, WASHINGTON
6	v.) June 6, 2018
7	WADE G. BREWER,) Motion Hearing
8	Defendant.)
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10	VERBATIM REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROBERT S. LASNIK
12	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
13	
14	APPEARANCES:
15	ATTEMORIOEO.
16	
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	Stenographically reported - Transcript produced with computer-aided technology ——Debbie Zurn - RMR, CRR - Federal Court Reporter - 700 Stewart Street - Suite 17205 - Seattle WA 98101

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             THE CLERK: Case C15-1215-L, Money Mailer versus Wade
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    Brewer. Counsel, please make your appearances.
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             MR. ALEXANDER: Nathan Alexander with Dorsey Whitney
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    on behalf of plaintiff and counterclaim defendants, Money
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    Mailer Franchise Corp., and Money Mailer LLC. I am joined at
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    counsel table, and it's my pleasure to introduce you to Joe
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    Craciun from Money Mailer, general counsel.
             THE COURT: Great. Thanks very much.
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             MR. BROWN: Your Honor, Daniel Brown on behalf of
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    Mr. Brewer. Mr. Brewer is here today in the audience. On my
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    right is Mr. Velloth and Mr. Rosenberg of my office.
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             THE COURT: Thank you.
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        Mr. Rosenberg, you changed law firms.
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             MR. ROSENBERG: I did, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: It's good to see you. Still on that side
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    of the table?
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             MR. ROSENBERG: I'd get lost over there.
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             THE COURT: Yeah. Absolutely.
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        Mr. Rosenberg, in his previous life, was in a firm that
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    would appear in federal court quite a bit. And then one of
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    my truly landmark cases, Wilbur v. Mount Vernon, which is --
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    I told my career law clerk L.B., this is one that would be
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    sort of tombstone material for how important it was and how
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    novel it was. And Mr. Rosenberg did a very nice job for his
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    client, the cities of Mount Vernon and Burlington.
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were on the losing end of the case.
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But the cities accepted the ruling, didn't appeal, and actually used it for a wake-up call for the fact that they were not providing indigent defense systems that they should have been, and even sort of proselytized to other cities in the State of Washington: Don't get caught like we did, kind of asleep, and upgrade your indigent defense system. So it really was a win/win in that sense. Don't you think, Adam?

MR. ROSENBERG: If you're going to lose, it's good to lose and makes society a little bit better.

THE COURT: A better place. Good enough.

Well, we are here on Mr. Brewer's motion for partial summary judgment. And I take it, Mr. Brown, you'll be making the argument?

MR. BROWN: I will. Ready, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Very ready, yes.

MR. BROWN: Just feel free to jump in with any questions that you have, Your Honor. I know you're not shy about that.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BROWN: You know, reading this again yesterday, as I did before the hearing just to get prepared, it almost felt like the peerless from law school. It's like the two briefs passing in the night. And I kept saying, why is that? And I realize it's because half of Money Mailer's brief on

their facts, which is about half of it, doesn't address the facts that are at issue for this motion, at all.

Mr. Carr's declaration admits, in the smallest way possible, that there were markups made. But, you know, they don't want to talk about the amounts. So what we have here is a few admissions and a ton of non-denials, which are admissions for purposes of summary judgment. And I want to go over a few of those, Judge, with you right now.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BROWN: They do admit that they marked up the printing costs. And they admit something that we suspected but we still don't know in discovery, which they may have marked up a little, they say, other fixed costs; which is like being a little pregnant. And that's a problem under FIPA, Your Honor. So we've got a new admission that they've got other problems.

They don't deny that the markups on the printing were somewhere between 110 percent -- I'm rounding the number, Your Honor -- up to 150 percent, at times. They don't deny that there was a kickback, which is violative of the anti-kickback provisions of FIPA, from trying to offset printing, in third-party printing. They don't deny that. But we provided the actual contract that we did get in discovery, that actually calls it out that there's going to be a rebate.

They don't deny that they told franchisees, like Mr. Brewer, that they were able to get the most advantageous printing from a party like Trend Offset because of their economic might. You know, we've got, what did they say, 175 franchisees in 35 states, and we went out and got the best deal possible.

They also don't deny that they never told Mr. Brewer that they were marking up those printing costs between 110 percent plus, or on the other charges as Mr. Carr has admitted.

They don't deny that they ever told Mr. Brewer there was any markup at all. They never said that.

THE COURT: But Mr. Brewer does not deny that they told him what the costs would be?

MR. BROWN: Total costs, right. So, Your Honor, if you say -- I like using analyses -- you're going to go buy the pizza dough and the cost is going to be \$25 for the pizza dough. Okay. But the cost is really only \$12 to us, and we're marking it up another \$13. And that didn't get said. And that's a problem. Because Nelson, Your Honor, actually dealt with that issue. In Nelson, they told the franchisee, hey, there's a markup in this price you're getting. And the court said, that's not sufficient. They even told them there's a markup. And they figured it out right away, it's a 20 percent markup. And the court said, no, you've got to tell them all this before you enter into the contract, not

after the fact.

THE COURT: And you think this is something unique to the Franchise Act? I mean, an ordinary contract, 20 percent markup wouldn't necessarily be considered unconscionable, would it?

MR. BROWN: No, because under the Franchise Act, which is the whole idea if you look at the statutory history -- and Nelson talks about it and the other cases -- it's about maximizing disclosures, minimizing overreaching, and trying to correct this grand overplay of power, right? We have Money Mailer that's got all the information, all the knowledge, all the experience. And they're selling -- it's money in your mailbox, Your Honor, that's what they're selling, right? That's their little tag-line is, "It's money your mailbox." It's money in their mailbox.

THE COURT: And it goes right into my recycling.

MR. BROWN: It's a tough -- direct-mail marketing is obviously tough.

THE COURT: Very tough.

MR. BROWN: It's really tough when you don't know what you're paying for, and you think you're getting a good deal. And you think, oh, yeah, they went out and got the best price for me. And now we find out, actually more information we didn't have, Your Honor. They're shoving overhead into the printing costs. And the whole overhead for

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the business they put into printing costs. And a little bit
   somewhere else. We don't know where that is yet. Mr. Carr
   doesn't give us the specifics, but we're going to find it.
   They're putting it all there. They put the overhead there.
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Now, if they try to divide it, like in Nelson, they tried to make the argument: Well, let's use the costs, Your Honor, of the materials. Then we're going to have a royalty fee. Let's treat it that way. And the Supreme Court said: you don't get to do that either.

But more importantly, they didn't do that. They said to Mr. Brewer: Here's your costs, let's say it's \$50 a spot, and we're going to charge you an extra \$50 for this super secret proprietary process we have. Now, they did spend a lot of pages, by my count about 19 times in the brief and the declaration, about their proprietary costs.

If you know what it is, Your Honor, you're way ahead of me on this game, because I still don't know what it is. super secret. But they do say that they trained a vendor. Well, we know who that vendor is. They trained Trend to do all the stuff that's secret. But Trend is already charging them for that. So I don't think Trend is charging them twice. Trend is charging them for all that, all the stuff Trend is doing. And then they slap on another 110 to 150 percent.

You know, they don't also deny that Mr. Brewer didn't know

about that kickback from Trend. And they don't deny that they never told him about it. They don't deny that.

So the question is, what facts do we have to have to establish a violation of FIPA? Well, we've got them.

There's undisclosed markup. That's it. End of story. Got to disclose it.

And you kind of asked me if this was peculiar to the Franchise Act, Your Honor. I think it's actually peculiar to the franchise. And I always like to figure out why I think something happened. I'm going to surmise here, but I'm going to say what I think.

I think being in so many different jurisdictions, Money Mailer FC, the franchise corp thought, we're going to set up Money Mailer LLC, right? They're going to be the ones you buy the services from. You're going to have a separate contract -- which they never did, obviously, they're supposed to -- and we're going to set it up where we charge a pretty low royalty fee, and a pretty low franchise fee to begin with. And that's going to be nice and low.

And then we're going to go ahead and put all of our charges and all our overhead in the other company. And we're not going to tell these guys about it, and they're going to pay it, and they're going to think: Well, this is a pretty good franchise, I don't have to pay a lot of royalty fees. I'm getting this good printing deal, it's the best deal they

could find. That sounds like a good deal. And they don't know about it. And they thought that was okay. Probably because they are in too many states, Your Honor. Maybe it's okay in other states. It's not okay in Washington. You have to disclose.

And you know why I think this is the story? Because earlier in this case -- you're not going to hear it today because it's clear that MMLLC is also a person under the Act, and they're stuck with the FIPA provisions -- earlier in the case they tried to argue: We're not subject, MMLLC is not subject to FIPA. I think they actually believed that when they set this whole thing up and they thought, this is how we're going to do it. I don't know if it works in California or any of the other states they're in. It doesn't work here. They have to disclose. That's it. There's a franchise violation.

THE COURT: And the FIPA doesn't have a damages section. But you would have to prove, obviously, economic damages.

MR. BROWN: It has a restitution. It has rescission. It has trebling in whatever damages you prove, Your Honor. Their argument is kind of -- I don't really understand this argument, if you read the statute and how it's constructed. I know they like *Red Lion*, because the Ninth Circuit wasn't dealing with that issue, and was dealing with a complete

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    unresolved issue that had nothing to do with this issue and
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    said: Oh, there's no remedies. Well, there's remedies all
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    over the statute. I guess they want you to shake your finger
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    at them, Your Honor, three times, treble. Bad franchisor.
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             THE COURT: But you also are claiming that you
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    deserve summary judgment on your Consumer Protection Act.
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    Aren't there other elements on the CPA claim?
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             MR. BROWN: Well, there are, but we think we've
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    proved them. Let's go through them. First of all, unfair
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    and deceptive. That's checked. Right? Public interest.
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    That's checked under the statute, too. The case law says one
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    thing and the legislature said, no, this is a public
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    interest. We've satisfied that.
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        So now what's left? Trade or commerce? Well, I don't
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    think anybody -- they're not going to argue this wasn't in
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    the trade or commerce. This wasn't a personal thing, this
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    was clearly a business in 35 states, 175 franchisees. And
    Mr. Brewer is doing business.
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        Mr. Brewer is injured. We allege Mr. Brewer overpaid on
    these illegal charges. They're illegal under FIPA.
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    overpaid them. They don't deny that. Another non-denial,
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    Your Honor, another admission by denial is that he paid
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    hundreds of thousands of dollars in excess on these markups.
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    So, there's clearly damage.
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        I think it's Perrag -- what's the case -- the Panag case
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in Washington talks about damages. Frankly, if you pick up a phone and call a lawyer, Your Honor, that's damages. I mean, damages is almost presumed under the CPA, to be honest. But we have way more than that allegation. And again, they don't go through and say, well, Mr. Brewer didn't pay anything on these extremely marked up printing costs over the years. He paid hundreds of thousands of dollars on just those alone. So clearly he's been damaged.

And the fifth one is, is it proximately based upon the wrongful conduct? Well, yeah, if they hadn't marked it up illegally, he wouldn't have paid it. So, I think we meet all those.

Their defense to this, rather than take on any of those facts, which are so obvious, Your Honor, they say: Well you didn't say those words, Mr. Brown, in your brief. You just said you're liable under CPA. And you didn't go through and explain how this would be in trade or commerce.

Well, I'm sorry, Your Honor, we only have so many pages in these jurisdictions. And I wouldn't think we need to waste time on that. But if the court needs more briefing, Your Honor, we can supplement this in a day. I could probably supplement it by the end of the day. I mean, it's pretty obvious.

So the CPA has also been established. And they have different remedies, right? FIPA gives you treble damages

possibility. CPA gives you treble damages, but limited to an amount. Attorneys fees are not mandatory under FIPA. You get some other remedies under FIPA that you wouldn't get in CPA. You get the equitable remedies. You get recision. You get all kinds of things. So there's clearly remedies.

And we're not here about remedies, though, right? That's another point, Your Honor, this is not a motion about remedies. This is a motion about liability. We'll be dealing with that, trust me, as this case goes forward, what the remedies are and what Mr. Brewer elects as his remedies.

I guess really that takes us down to what real defenses do they have that they raise in the motion, besides what you and I just talked about? And I'd say they raised laches. I don't know if I really have to address laches. We addressed it in the brief. They don't allege prejudice, I guess their prejudice would be over this lawsuit, which is never sufficient prejudice to justify laches. You have to have a different kind of prejudice. Otherwise it would always be laches, every time. You sue me tomorrow. Oh, that's laches, I'm now in a lawsuit.

Statute of limitations. They cite an unpublished case for the proposition, which has also the language that we cited, which we relied on, and other cases that said: Look, you hid it from us. Trust me, Your Honor, I would have been here two years ago with this motion if I had that document that we now

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    have. They wouldn't give it to us. And I'm sure you recall,
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    Your Honor, I was standing right here, we argued about this
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    and I said: We think they're doing this. We can't prove it
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    yet, but we're going to get this discovery.
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        And we have new counsel now, and we've got the discovery,
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    and there's the document. They don't say that document was
    something else. They don't say, oh, it was a marketing tool
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    or it was a pro forma. No, they just let it sit there and
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    say, yep, we're marking it up, we're shoving our overhead in
    there and other costs in there, because we provide this super
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    service, this super-secret service.
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        I don't know if that's true or not. But it doesn't matter
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    under FIPA. They can't get away from it on that. Nelson
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    doesn't allow that. None of the case law allows that.
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             THE COURT: Mr. Brown.
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             MR. BROWN:
                         Yep.
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             THE COURT: I think I'm going to give my court
    reporter a little rest now and have you deal with the rest in
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    rebuttal.
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             MR. BROWN: Yep, that would be great, Your Honor.
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                         The court reporters love me because I
             THE COURT:
    take care of them.
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              Mr. Alexander. And you'll win a lot of points if
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    you just slow it down a little bit.
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MR. ALEXANDER: I will do my best, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: He was fast, wasn't he?

THE COURT REPORTER: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. ALEXANDER: Mr. Brown summed up their summary judgment motion as FIPA requires markups. And because there were undisclosed markups, you have a violation of FIPA and they're entitled to damages. That's simply not the law and it's not supported by the facts of this case.

Details matter. The very detailed declarations that came in from Mr. Martin, who was the director of plant operations, as well as the declaration from Ryan Carr, the CFO for Money Mailer FC, Money Mailer LLC, and even Money Mailer Holding Corporation, goes through a very detailed explanation of what their actual costs were to get to what? An end product.

Money Mailer's system is based around providing an envelope filled with advertisements that will correctly go to over 1,400 zones. And as Mr. Carr described it, it is over 500 million advertisements that go into those mailings each and every mailing, 12 during the year. So we're talking about billions of advertising across over 175 franchisees, 35 states, culling all that information, putting it together, in what Mr. Martin describes is a very detailed process by which they create the printing plates that are then given to Trend Offset to execute the printing.

Trend Offset was able to do so several years after

Mr. Brewer became a franchisee, by the way. But Trend Offset

was able to do so after extensive investment training from Money Mailer as to their entire integrated system that allows this franchise to work.

And Mr. Carr's declaration is unrebutted that Money Mailer had certain costs that were actual costs in producing those mailings, and that they were very close to what they were charging Mr. Brewer. If you look at his declaration, particularly paragraphs 18 through 24, and he actually provides the backup data to support those, as well as schedules to do the math. We can see that of course there were markups. We don't shy away from markups. That's how businesses are conducted. There has to be some value that they're adding to the franchises. And then they're paid for that.

THE COURT: But what about disclosure?

MR. ALEXANDER: Sure. I say that the facts demonstrate, rather, that there is adequate disclosure under the FDD, under all of the various pieces of information that were given to Mr. Brewer, under his research prior to joining. The FDD is interesting. It discloses fully who all the players are. Money Mailer Franchise Corporation, as the franchisor; Money Mailer LLC as the operations company; Money Mailer Holding Company, that is the parent to both of those entities. It fully discloses that the money Money Mailer makes is derived almost entirely from Money Mailer LLC, the

operations of the business. And it indicates that in Item 8 of the FDD.

It even is so precise as to say, you're going to have fixed costs and variable costs, printing and art costs that are going to be in addition to the fixed costs, about 115 per spot, for you to carry out this business.

As it turns out, Mr. Brewer paid far less than that. There were economies that were built into it, and those savings were passed on to the franchisee. What we have to establish today is that there are disputed issues of fact as to every element of the claim that would be required for them to win judgment against Money Mailer. And so the law is incredibly important and it's been misstated. But the law is important as to what's being alleged today.

They are alleging violations of two provisions of Section 180 of the Franchise Act, which is called the Bill of Rights, for shorthand. The two provisions are: One, you have to sell goods and services at a fair and reasonable price.

That's under Subsection D. Then Subsection E says: If you're obtaining any benefit from a third party, you have to disclose that benefit. They did all of that.

There cannot be just a mere statement from Brewer: I found an internal document that says the printing costs are \$44.53 -- I'll throw out as one of the examples -- that is a fully burdened printing cost. They're actually charging me

over \$95. Wow, that is 110 percent markup. He is incompetent to provide that kind of evidence, because he has no idea what that line in that PowerPoint presentation even means. And that was fully disclosed as a part of the declarations from Mr. Carr and Mr. Martin.

There is a printing cost that first the LLC kind of carried out, then Trend Offset carried out, to actually physically print out the product. Then there's an insertion charge.

But beyond that, there are all sorts of expenses and costs that get us to the final product, and that's what this is all about. How much are we charging you to have your stack of envelopes that you can send to your zones? All of that information was adequately disclosed. The question is whether it's a fair and reasonable price, not did it have a markup.

And certainly *Nelson*, nor the legislature, even implied that 20 percent was somehow a per se line in the sand, above which you would have a violation of FIPA. In fact, we cited to the legislative history that said specifically, we're not setting such a line. There has to be a determination of what the market is setting for these goods and services.

THE COURT: So are you saying the Supreme Court's decision in *Nelson* is just flat out wrong, that it didn't take account of legislative history? Or are you saying it's

a distinguishable case?

MR. ALEXANDER: I'm saying it's a distinguishable case. I don't think *Nelson* even attempted to try to pass a ruling on a 20 percent markup. There is not enough information from the court's decision, as well as the record that we could see, as to why 20 percent was excessive or an unfair and unreasonable price.

We can sort of guess to that, because what was being provided in *Nelson* was basic pizza ingredients. And by the way, Mr. Brown is wrong, the franchisees did not know what the price was. They were told that after they got their first bill, which was after they signed their franchise agreement. Then they realized, oh, they're slapping on a 20 percent markup to ordinary old, you know, dough, and other ingredients for the pizza. And the court took particular note of that.

And then the rationalization was, well, this 20 percent, really it's a franchise fee. And the court said, no, you can't just change the character of that payment. There wasn't a discussion as to 20 percent in and of itself sets the mark for what is unfair and unreasonable.

THE COURT: So you're saying it's always going to be a fact issue about whether the costs are reasonable, not whether you failed to disclose what the markups were?

MR. ALEXANDER: Correct. The first inquiry has to

be, is it a fair and reasonable price? And then, did you receive something in benefit that you didn't disclose to the franchisee? Well, they disclosed fully what the costs of those printings would be, and what Money Mailer LLC would be obtaining for providing those services.

They used the term "kickback". There are no kickbacks in this case. There's been zero evidence of it. A kickback is when a vendor charges the buyer a certain price, and then pays back to the buyer a certain amount of money. Kickbacks, of course, are illegal because they avoid taxes. There's all kinds of reasons why the law has a problem with kickbacks.

What they point to -- and of course they don't show you the language, they just say: Oh, and Trend Offset, their contract even had evidence of a kickback. No. That merely said that there would be volume discounts. The more you print, the less it will be. And guess what? They passed those savings on to the franchisee.

Mr. Brewer, in fact, benefited from that. The more you print, the less it will cost for those printings. That's why the price went down from \$115 per spot, all the way down to what he was paying, which was in some cases \$94, some cases \$88. And you can see that from looking at the math in Mr. Carr's declaration. So he clearly was receiving the benefit of the lower costs.

Volume discounts are not kickbacks. There was no money

being paid back from Trend Offset to Money Mailer. There was no money being paid from Money Mailer LLC to Money Mailer Franchise Corp. They provided the services. Money Mailer Franchise Corp provided the franchise and required the royalties. They were separate fees. They were collected separately. So there isn't a disclosure issue here at all.

What this boils down to is really Mr. Brewer just didn't run his franchise in a way that would have ensured success. He didn't charge enough for his spots. And he didn't sell enough spots. When you have the price structure that's fully disclosed under the FDD, it's very apparent that this is what you're going to pay in terms of getting this end product out the door. And if you sell more ads or sell your ads for more, everything above that is more and more profit to yourself. And he just simply didn't do that.

So as Mr. Carr described, you know, he could have -- we didn't -- Money Mailer did not earn much, if any, profit on him. It was perhaps 3 percent in some months. And he gave another extreme example of 15 percent. The whole operation makes between 2.2 and 5 point -- I think it was -- I'm blanking on the number, 5.8 perhaps in total profit on the entire enterprise. So this isn't a matter of where they're just trying to put all of this on the backs of the poor unsuspecting franchisee. They were fully aware of everything.

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             THE COURT: If there is a franchise, a FIPA
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    violation, is it a per se CPA violation? And if not, what
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    elements of the CPA do you contest?
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             MR. ALEXANDER: Correct. 180 is very clear, and it
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    fits beautifully with the CPA Act 19.86, that if there is a
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    violation of the Bill of Rights, then you have the unfair or
    deceptive practice. So you've met one of your elements of a
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    CPA claim.
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        But you still have to establish the remaining four
    elements of your CPA claim. The way that 190 is structured,
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    it's very clear, Subsection 1, if you've got a violation of
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    180, it's a CPA claim. Period. End of story. If you have
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    other violations of FIPA, they fall under Subsection 2. And
    there are different remedies. They're treated a little bit
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    differently.
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        All the case law that we've seen, Nelson, the Ninth
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    Circuit, your colleague on the bench, Judge Robart in the
    Volvo case, looked at that and said, yeah, you've got to make
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    sure you establish every element. If you only find an unfair
    and deceptive practice, does not mean that you've found a CPA
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    violation. You've got to establish the rest of the elements.
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             THE COURT: Okay. Thanks, Mr. Alexander.
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        Are you ready for Mr. Brown?
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             THE COURT REPORTER: Yes, Your Honor.
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MR. BROWN: Counsel didn't answer your question, Your

Honor. You asked what elements are they contesting. We don't know from their briefing, we don't know from the answer to the question, he just said you've got to prove them. I stand by what I said earlier, which is, what's there left to prove in light of what we alleged and what they haven't responded to?

I know you don't do this, Your Honor, but a lot of what Mr. Alexander said is not in declarations. A lot of it was argumentative, facts, with quotes around it, because they're not supported. But I will say this. Mr. Carr's declaration, there's an Exhibit 4 to it, Your Honor, and it talks about this idea that, well, the markup isn't as high as we said it is. Well, he's right. The billing to Mr. Brewer on that one that allegedly was picked out of a hat, you know, and said was \$72,000 and some change, almost \$73,000, and he said the costs were only \$62,000 to them.

And you're like, well, that's only a \$10,000 -- it's actually about a \$10,500 markup. But, again, if you look at that exhibit, guess what they shoved in there? \$13,000 of overhead. You know, if I wanted to put my building, and the Christmas party for the firm, Your Honor, and the pens and papers, and the rental of all of the FAX machines, and everything else we do, bonuses, all my overhead into printing costs that are a line item on a charge, and say, that's where I'm going to put all my overhead, I don't know how that's not

a failure to disclose. Because he says they disclosed everything.

We allege they never told us anything about that. And where in Mr. Carr's ten-page declaration, or in Mr. Martin's ten-page declaration do one of them ever utter the words:

"Yes, we did. Yes, I did."

THE COURT: What about Mr. Alexander's argument that if the costs are ultimately reasonable, there is no violation here, it needs to be both non-disclosed and unreasonable?

MR. BROWN: That's not what the law says. That's not what *Nelson* says, for sure. *Nelson* is very clear. Failure to disclose is a violation. That's the very purpose, right? It's the idea, before you suck in the franchisee, you've got to disclose everything, as I quoted the language to you earlier, Your Honor, about the balance of power.

I mean, *Nelson* actually uses pretty good language about the inequities here, and they have all the power and knowledge. And Mr. Brewer and any other franchisee has no bargaining position. Take it or leave it, right? They're not begging him. Well, they might have in this case because he actually took over a corporately run system.

I think it's kind of funny that they mention -- they always want to hammer Mr. Brewer. He didn't charge enough. He charged what they were charging, Your Honor, when he took it. What's he supposed to do, go to the dry clearer and say:

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Hey, I'm the new owner, they were charging you \$50, I'm going to charge you \$100. Oh, and I'm also supposed to grow it. Well, he grew it 50 percent. They said he needs to grow it 4 another 50 percent. Their argument is, if he had just been a great enough businessman, Your Honor, he would have made enough money, this never would have been an issue, we never would have been found out. He would have made some profit and it would have been okay.

Well, that's not the standard. The way they want to read FIPA, reads FIPA right out of FIPA. There is nothing left. I mean, there is nothing there when they say: Hey, we've done everything we had to. We were totally up front. The kickback provisions that we're getting better deals after the fact, well, Mr. Brewer is not there any longer, Your Honor, so whatever benefits they're getting, he's not getting them from this provision. He wasn't told about it. He wasn't given the option to say: Did you understand that for every dollar you're going to pay for printing costs, they're going to charge you another dollar, dollar-fifty? Would you have signed up for that deal? FIPA says, no, too bad, that's illegal. It's improper. Can't do it.

More importantly, all those things he said that Mr. Martin says in his ten pages of declaration, Your Honor, about again the great proprietary system of how the insertion, and the shipping -- well, those are all line item charges we already

1 get. All that sounds like overhead. We developed this Overhead. Good. You developed these processes. 2 process. 3 It's overhead. If you want to shove it in printing costs 4 that you represent is the cost of printing that we're being 5 charged, and we went out -- unquestioned, they don't deny it 6 -- we went out and got the best rates possible. We used to 7 do it in-house, but now we've got even better rates. You 8 know, they're going up a little bit, you know how the world 9 is. Mr. Brewer is not told: Oh, printing costs are only 10 half of that, the rest is our overhead, and, you know, 11 Mr. Craciun's bonus, and whatever else is going on in the 12 That's not fair, Your Honor, and that's what FIPA 13 is about, it's all for the benefit of the franchisee. 14 The last thing I would say is, I'm not saying Nelson is 15 the clearest case in the world. But you know what Nelson 16 didn't say -- and this is the Supreme Court, this isn't some 17 unpublished Court of Appeals decision -- Nelson didn't say, oh, based on the evidence at trial, the trial court was 18 19 correct that there was sufficient evidence to justify it. 20 That's not what they said. *Nelson* went a lot further than 21 that. And they didn't use a dollar amount, which makes 22 sense, they used a percentage. 23 But even if you said, I don't know if 20 percent is really 24 per se unfair, although I think that's what Nelson says, 25 whether we think it's weird or not, that's not for us to

decide actually, because they are the highest speaker on state-law interpretation. How can any reasonable fact finder -- if we're going to talk about fair and just -- forget the disclosure, which I think they're dead in the water, that's all you need to do -- how would any factfinder say that 110 to 150 percent undisclosed markup that is not printing costs, not fixed costs, it's your overhead and other things, how would that be fair and reasonable? How would any factfinder find that?

Courts don't use it very often, Your Honor, but they should, which is, no reasonable factfinder would find that's reasonable. Nobody would find that you marking it up that much and not telling someone about it makes it fair and reasonable. They took that away from Mr. Brewer. And that's what FIPA says you can't do. You should have gave them the choice. Then we'd have a different situation. Hey, it's a service fee. Hey, it's a royalty fee. It covers our overhead. This is what we do to make money. They didn't do that, Your Honor.

Any questions, Judge? I'd be happy to answer them.

THE COURT: No, I'm good. Thank you. I appreciate it. And I know that we also have Mr. Brewer's motion for a brief continuance of the trial date and related deadlines, that just became fully briefed last week. And I will get a ruling out on both those matters this week. Okay? So you

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     will be told where we stand at the end of this week. Okay?
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     Thanks very much, counsel. Appreciate it.
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                                  (Adjourned.)
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                            CERTIFICATE
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         I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from
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     the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
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     /s/ Debbie Zurn
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     COURT REPORTER
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